# Vault, sign-in and secrets (/docs/browser/vault)

Credentials an agent can use without seeing them, and where the other secrets an identity names are kept.

An identity can keep a username, a password and a TOTP secret per site, only in the OS secret store (the macOS Keychain or the Linux Secret Service):

```sh
turno-browser vault add school mail --url https://mail.example.com/login --username alice --totp
turno-browser vault list school
```

The password and the TOTP secret are asked with hidden prompts (or read from stdin). An agent then calls `browser_login` with the site name on that sign-in page: the tool fills the username, the password and the current one-time code without the agent seeing them, only on the origins given with `--url`, and hides the values from every later result. It does not submit the form unless you run `turno-browser vault submit school auto`. See the threat model in [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/wimo-dev/turno/blob/main/SECURITY.md#the-credential-vault).

## Secrets [#secrets]

An `identity.json` never holds a secret. It names one as `keychain:<item>` (`proxy.password`, `act.key`, `captcha.key`), and so does a replay parameter (`--param password=keychain:<item>`). The value lives in the login Keychain on macOS or the Secret Service on Linux:

```sh
turno-browser secret set proxy-password      # asks with a hidden prompt, or reads stdin
turno-browser secret has proxy-password      # exits 0 when the item exists
turno-browser secret list                    # every keychain: reference in identity.json, and whether it is stored
turno-browser secret remove proxy-password
```

Values are never printed and never passed as an argument. They are the same items `turno secret` uses, so with turno installed either command works. Sign-in credentials do not go here: they live in the vault above.